Combatting the Rise of China: A Center-Right Realist Approach
- Andrew Thompson

- Jul 26
- 5 min read
The Problem
The rise of China poses a critical policy challenge that the President of the United States
must address. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has significantly expanded its military capabilities, with
defense spending more than tripling since 2008. Following this aggressive posturing, China is
pursuing asymmetric military threats and coercion in the South China Sea. These trends raise the
risk of conflict, particularly regarding Taiwan, where U.S. commitments, regional stability, and
global economic security intersect. Additionally, China’s use of unfair trade practices, cyber
intrusions, and intellectual-property violations harm American businesses by undermining U.S.
economic competitiveness and technological leadership.
In recent years, the U.S. has employed a mix of engagement and pressure in its approach
to China. Specifically, the Trump Administration utilized mixed signals and vague actions in
their approach, an obscurity by design, to catch China off guard and force President Xi to the
negotiation table. Accordingly, they hosted summits and signed executive orders to discuss the
ongoing trade war with China. Nonetheless, the overall strategy remained fragmented across
economic, technological, and security domains.
A coherent strategy to manage long-term competition with China must address military,
economic, and technological dimensions in a timely manner. Therefore, U.S. policymakers must
craft a coordinated, effective and time-efficient package.
Policy Options
Option 1: Strengthen diplomatic engagement by pursuing smart competition
The first option involves strengthening U.S. diplomacy with China through a smart
competition strategy. Smart competition focuses on reinforcing U.S. strengths, while managing
areas of disagreement and identifying opportunities for cooperation on shared interests. Under
this plan, the President would appoint a special liaison to Beijing to stabilize the relationship,
establish a joint crisis hotline, and propose a joint roundtable. Through these mechanisms,
leaders in Beijing and Washington could cooperate on priority issues such as climate policy,
countering North Korea’s nuclear program, and infrastructure investment. In addition to
enhancing diplomatic relations with China, this policy requires the U.S. to strengthen
coordination with allies in Europe and East Asia to pursue a unified approach toward Beijing.
Nonetheless, the U.S. will also use the international stage to call out China when China harms
U.S. interests.
A smart-competition approach would increase U.S. leverage by linking cooperation to
mutual interests, serving as a deterrent to escalation. Moreover, it would strengthen alliances and
reassure global partners after recent periods of uncertainty. Nonetheless, the policy poses the risk
of increased interdependence with China, which could limit the President’s flexibility in
adjusting the relationship over time. Additionally, the policy requires careful implementation to
avoid undercutting core American values and commitments.
Option 2: Solidify President Trump’s hardline approach by increasing competition
The second option involves solidifying President Trump’s hardline approach to China by
intensifying various policies. Specifically, the intelligence community would ramp up
intelligence gathering to target individuals and businesses for sanctions. The President would
sign an executive order to increase tariffs on select goods and services imported from China. The Department of War would conduct joint military exercises with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan
in the South China Sea to defend the waters, increase the stationing of planes and ships in the
region, and provide security guarantees for Asian allies. The U.S. Congress would propose
legislation to toughen technology transfers and counter unfair trade and investment practices.
Finally, the U.S. as a whole will officially label China as an adversary rather than a competitor.
Pursuing a hardline approach would level the global playing field by punishing unfair
trade practices and human rights violations. Additionally, tariffs and sanctions would weaken
China’s economy, thereby weakening the Chinese military. Nonetheless, the strategy poses the
risks of disrupting global supply chains and tariffs harming the U.S. economy by raising prices
for consumers. In fact, reduced diplomatic leverage might strengthen China’s role as a security
threat.
Option 3: Support economic resilience by rebuilding American power at home
The final option emphasizes prioritizing U.S. domestic renewal as the foundation of
long-term strategic competition, reducing reliance on direct confrontation with China. Under this
approach, Congress would pass legislation to expand federal investment in manufacturing,
artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and telecommunications. The administration would
also work to streamline defense procurement, modernize supply chains for critical minerals and
semiconductors, and restructure STEM education and workforce-training programs, including
reauthorizing the WIOA. To protect its democracy from Chinese influence, the U.S. would
enhance election security, expand counter-intelligence capabilities, and increase its defense
budget.
The investments inherent to option three would strengthen the U.S. economy and
diminish its dependence on global supply chains, empowering the United States to compete with
China from a position of structural strength. However, the policy carries the same risks as option
two, in addition to isolating allies and inadvertently enabling China to gain additional influence
in developing nations and Eastern Asia. Furthermore, the package requires substantial funding
costs, which could be partially offset by revenue from job creation.
Recommendation
An analysis of the benefits and risks proves that none of the policies on their own are
ideal in countering the rise of China. While option one is the strongest for balancing engagement
with deterrence, option two is strong in exerting maximum immediate pressure. Option three is
strong for long-term competition, but insufficient alone for short-term deterrence.
Accordingly, this memorandum recommends a balanced, hybrid approach that blends
option one with aspects of option two. Specifically, the U.S. will employ a smart competition
strategy, including the appointment of the special liaison, establishment of a joint crisis hotline,
and creation of a roundtable for cooperative initiatives, complemented by targeted sanctions and
tariffs to encourage China to negotiate in good faith. The U.S. will coordinate with allies to
pursue a joint agenda and enhance credibility.
This recommendation carries the benefits of both options, while downplaying their risks.
Regarding the trade-offs of option one, the hybrid model would strengthen alliances, reassuring
partners around the globe after recent periods of uncertainty, but maintaining standards and
redlines would allow the President’s flexibility in adjusting the relationship over time. Regarding
option two, this recommendation punishes unfair trade practices and IP violations, but does not
isolate allies or provide China an opportunity to gain the upper hand in the region.
Overall, a hybrid strategy provides the President with a coordinated, timely, and
efficacious course of action to manage U.S. competition with China.
References
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Jones, B. (2020, February). China and the return of great power strategic competition. The
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etition_jones.pdf
Lewis, J. A. (2018, March 22). How much have the Chinese actually taken? Center for Strategic
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O’Rourke, R. (2024, August 26). U.S.–China strategic competition in South and East China
Seas: Background and issues for Congress (CRS Report R42784). Congressional
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This is a very good breakdown on the whole China situation and I think it's very complicated! Let's hope that future generations will be able to balance this issue and situation fairly and with good ideas.